Here are some examples of awareness and considerations concerning awareness that don't yet fit the framework of the previous sections.
I am slow to solve the problem because I waste time thinking about ducks. I'd like Mark Stickel's SNARK to observe, ``I'm slow to solve the problem, because I keep proving equivalent lemmas over and over''.
I was aware that I was letting my dislike of the man influence me to reject his proposal unfairly.
Here are some general considerations about what fluents should be used in making self-aware systems.
1. Observability. One can observe ones intentions. One cannot observe the state of ones brain at a more basic level. This is an issue of epistemological adequacy as introduced in [McCarthy and Hayes 1969].
2. Duration. Intentions can last for many years, e.g. "I intend to retire to Florida when I'm 65". "I intend to have dinner at home unless something better turns up."
3. Forming a system with other fluents. Thus beliefs lead to other beliefs and eventually actions.
Is there a technical difference between observations that constitute self-observations and those that don't? Do we need a special mechanism for self-observation? At present I don't think so.
If is a precondition for some action, it may not be in consciousnes, but if the action becomes considered, whether is true will then come into consciousnes, i.e. short term memory. We can say that the agent is subaware of .
What programming languages provide for interrupts?