Miscellaneous

Here are some examples of awareness and considerations concerning awareness that don't yet fit the framework of the previous sections.

I am slow to solve the problem because I waste time thinking about ducks. I'd like Mark Stickel's SNARK to observe, ``I'm slow to solve the problem, because I keep proving equivalent lemmas over and over''.

I was aware that I was letting my dislike of the man influence me to reject his proposal unfairly.

Here are some general considerations about what fluents should be used in making self-aware systems.

1. Observability. One can observe ones intentions. One cannot observe the state of ones brain at a more basic level. This is an issue of epistemological adequacy as introduced in [McCarthy and Hayes 1969].

2. Duration. Intentions can last for many years, e.g. "I intend to retire to Florida when I'm 65". "I intend to have dinner at home unless something better turns up."

3. Forming a system with other fluents. Thus beliefs lead to other beliefs and eventually actions.

Is there a technical difference between observations that constitute self-observations and those that don't? Do we need a special mechanism for self-observation? At present I don't think so.

If $p$ is a precondition for some action, it may not be in consciousnes, but if the action becomes considered, whether $p$ is true will then come into consciousnes, i.e. short term memory. We can say that the agent is subaware of $p$.

What programming languages provide for interrupts?