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[McC95] discusses the kinds of consciousness of its own mental
processes a robot will require in order to behave intelligently. Here
are a few of them.
- Keeping a journal of physical and intellectual events
so it can refer to its past beliefs, observations and actions.
- Observing its goal structure and forming sentences about it.
Notice that merely having a stack of subgoals doesn't achieve this
unless the stack is observable and not merely obeyable.
- The robot may intend to perform a certain action. It
may later infer that certain possibilities are irrelevant in
view of its intentions. This requires the ability to observe
intentions.
- Observing how it arrived at its current beliefs.
Most of the important beliefs of the system will have been
obtained by nonmonotonic reasoning, and therefore are usually
uncertain. It will need to maintain a critical view of these
beliefs, i.e. believe meta-sentences about them that will aid
in revising them when new information warrants doing so. It will
presumably be useful to maintain a pedigree for each belief of
the system so that it can be revised if its logical ancestors
are revised. Reason maintenance systems maintain
the pedigrees but not in the form of sentences that can
be used in reasoning. Neither do they have
introspective subroutines that can observe the pedigrees
and generate sentences about them.
- Not only pedigrees of beliefs but other auxiliary information
should either be represented as sentences or be observable in such
a way as to give rise to sentences. Thus a system should be able to
answer the questions: ``Why do I believe p?'' or alternatively
``Why don't I believe p?''.
- Regarding its entire mental state up to the present as an
object, i.e. a context. [McC93] discusses contexts as
formal objects. The ability to transcend one's present
context and think about it as an object is an important form of
introspection, especially when we compare human and machine
intelligence as Roger Penrose (1994) and other philosophical AI critics do.
- Knowing what goals it can currently achieve and what its choices
are for action. We claim that the ability to understand one's own
choices constitutes free will. The subject is discussed in
detail in [MH69].
Taken together these requirements for successful human-level goal
achieving behavior amount to a substantial fraction of human
consciousness. A human emotional structure is not required for
robots.
Next: Moody Zombies
Up: Todd Moody's Zombies
Previous: Basic Consciousness
John McCarthy
Fri Feb 28 07:25:22 PDT 1997